Abstract: Total factor productivity (TFP) in Latin America has declined relative to the US since the mid-1970s. This paper applies a comparable methodology to firmlevel data of ten Latin American countries to quantify the heterogeneity of firm productivity and the extent to which resource misallocation can explain lower aggregate TFP. In general, productivity heterogeneity and resource misallocation are found to be much larger than in the US. Achieving an efficient allocation of resources could boost manufacturing TFP between 41% and 122% depending on the countries and years considered. We also find that difficulty in access to capital and restrictive labor regulations explain distortions faced by firms.
Introduction
Instead of closing, the gap between Latin America and the developed world has widened dramatically in the last 50 years. In 1955, GDP per capita in Latin America relative to the US was 28%. In 2005, it was 19%. Growth accounting exercises indicate that the main reason behind this divergence has been the low total factor productivity (TFP) growth experienced by Latin American economies since the mid-1970s. 1 Aggregate productivity gains are usually thought to be driven mostly by upgrades in the processes, products or machinery used by firms, affected in turn by investments in human capital, R&D, technology diffusion and externalities. In that context, low TFP growth is usually caused by barriers that prevent diffusion and implementation of new technologies.
2 Low aggregate TFP growth, however, can also be explained by a number of policy and market failures that determine the selection of firms in the market as well as the allocation of resources across firms. In the presence of distortions, productive firms are smaller than they would be in an undistorted economy, therefore lowering aggregate TFP. 3 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) develop a framework to estimate the potential impact of resource misallocation on aggregate TFP. They build a model of monopolistic competition with firms that have different productivities and face different product and factor prices due to firm-level distortions. In an economy without distortions all firms should hire labor and capital until the marginal revenue product is equated across firms. In an economy with distortions there will be differences between the marginal revenue product of capital and labor across firms. Firms that face negative distortions (in the form of a lower output price or a higher factor prices) will hire fewer resources than they would otherwise. Firms with positive distortions would hire more. This misallocation of resources moves aggregate TFP away from the optimum.
In Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2010) , we follow the work by Hsieh and Klenow to quantify the dispersion of productivity and distortions as well as the potential gains in TFP of reallocating resources more efficiently across firms in Latin American countries. We find that both firms' productivity and firms' distortions are very heterogeneous even within narrowly defined sectors. Typically, in a 4-digit industry a few very productive firms coexist with many firms of extremely low productivity. Reallocating capital and labor to equalize marginal products in manufacturing would raise aggregate TFP in Latin America between 40 and 120%, depending on the countries and years considered.
Building on that work, in this paper we continue using establishment-level data produced by countries' statistical offices of ten Latin American countries and complement it with data from World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), to provide a broad set of measures of the extent by which misallocation of resources can explain differences in productivity between Latin America and the US. We apply a common methodology to all datasets in order to obtain comparable statistics for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela. In most cases, even though data coverage varies across countries, data are drawn from censuses of the largest, formally established firms, with a random sample of smaller firms. The datasets are representative at the national level and span a period of nearly 10 years. Typically, coverage is restricted to the manufacturing sector and most of the analysis is restricted to firms of ten or more employees.
We revisit Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2010) and make several contributions. First, we provide a detailed description of the methodology, data sources and variable definitions and estimate a larger set of statistics to better characterize the distribution of productivity and distortions. Second, we derive a new set of results based on the WBES that, on the one hand, allows us to extend our sample of countries and, on the other, serves as comparison of the results obtained using official establishment-level data. Third, we show how measurements change when the smallest firms are added and provide separate estimates for other nonmanufacturing sectors in Mexico and Uruguay. Fourth, we assess the robustness of our results to changes in the model parameters. Finally, we use the WBES to build a set of variables that measure the degree to which public policies are constraints for firms in the region. We use these measures to find that firms located in sectors where access to credit and labor market regulations are more binding restrictions to firm operation also seem to face more distortions -measured by the dispersion of marginal revenue products.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the methodology and results of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) on which we base our work. Section 3 presents data sources and variable definitions. Section 4 shows the main results and some robustness analysis. Section 5 discusses the relation between productivity, distortions, misallocation of resources and policies in Latin America. Section 6 concludes.
Methodology and measurement
In this section we briefly outline Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model on which we base our results. Consider a standard model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms that face distortions in the prices they observe. These distortions drive wedges between the marginal products of capital and labor across firms, lowering aggregate TFP.
There is a single final good produced by a representative firm out of a set of goods Y s in a perfectly competitive final output market with a Cobb-Douglas Individual firm profits are given by:
where w, and R denote wages and the rental cost of capital, respectively. The marginal revenue products are given by ( ) 
It is important to distinguish between physical total factor productivity (TFPQ si ), measured by A si , and total factor revenue productivity (TFPR si ), measured by P si A si . Most establishment-level surveys do not record individual, plant or product level prices P si or real output Y si . In the model, however, product demand is given by
We can then estimate the physical productivity by means of the following expression which can be observed in the data:
P si Y si is measured by the observed value added. Since workers' human capital levels are not observable, the plant wage bill is used instead of labor input as a way of adjusting for differences in human capital across plants. α s is assumed to be the same for all firms in the same sector and measured as one minus the labor share in industry s in the US. 5 This is a simple way to control for distortions that could affect the capital share differently in different countries while the US is taken as a benchmark of an undistorted economy. The elasticity of substitution σ is taken to be equal to three across sectors and countries. 6 The dispersion of productivity within a narrowly defined sector is a measure of how much output can some firms extract with respect to similar firms in that same sector. We measure this dispersion by log .
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that the revenue productivity is proportional to the marginal revenue products of capital and labor
and that this, in turn was a function of the distortions faced by the firm
In an economy with no distortions, more inputs should be allocated to firms with the highest productivity, A si until TPPR si is equated across firms within a sector. In such an economy, there should be no dispersion in the distribution of relative within-sector TFPR. Departures from this benchmark determine the magnitude of distortions, which we will measure through the dispersion of log .
As reported by the Manufacturing Industry Database hosted by the NBER. 6 In the Section 4, we assess the robustness of the main results to alternative hypothesis about these two parameters. 7 The average TFPQ is taken via a geometric average:
The average TFPR is: 
In the absence of distortions, aggregate TFP will be higher because resources are reallocated from less to more productive firms. There will still be, however, some dispersion in the distribution of firms' productivities. We can compute the effi-
which can then be used as a benchmark to compute the output cost of deviations from the efficient allocation of resources. In particular, the gap between the efficient and the actual level of total factor productivity can be shown to be:
Data
We combine establishment-level produced by the countries' statistical offices with data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES (INE) . The survey covers the manufacturing sector and has a national coverage. All establishments with more than 15 employees were included in the survey and firms with less than 15 employees were subject to random sampling.
The data for Brazil is the Annual Industrial Survey produced by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography (IBGE). The dataset includes all firms with 30 employees or morein the manufacturing sector.
In the case of Colombia, results are based on the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). The survey is really a census of industrial plants with more than ten employees, or annual production above 115.5 million pesos (measured in 2005 levels).
We also use the manufacturing annual survey from Chile (Annual National Industrial Survey) gathered by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). This database is a census of every firm with ten or more employees, and allows following firms over the period 1979-2006. The data for Ecuador is the Annual Survey of Manufacture and Mining constructed by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC). The dataset constitutes an annual survey of firms in the manufacturing sector for firms with more than ten employees. The sample of firms is representative of the sector composition in the national accounts.
In the case of El Salvador we use data from the Economic Census, collected by the Statistical Direction of El Salvador (DIGESTYC) which registers all the establishments and firms in the territory with the exception of manufacture firms with less than five employees for which a representative sample is interviewed.
The data for Mexico comes from the Economic Census conducted by the Mexican Government's Statistical Institute (INEGI) every five years. The Economic Census is a census of all non-agricultural fixed establishments in Mexico. We have access to the establishments in manufacturing, services, and retail trade for two years, 1999 and 2004 . The raw data consists of over 3 million establishments in each year employing about 30 million workers in manufacture, commerce and services.
For Uruguay, we use the Economic Activity Survey for 1997-2005 from the National Statistics Institute (INE). We use annual firm level observations. The survey covers Uruguayan firms in a wide number of 4-digit ISIC sectors including, apart from manufacturing, a wide number of services and commerce sectors. Each 4-digit International Standard Industrial Classification sector was divided in two groups. All firms with more than 50 employers are included in the survey. For the group of firms with less than 50 employees a probabilistic sample was drawn.
Results for Venezuela are based on a panel of manufacturing plants drawn from the Venezuelan Industrial Survey conducted by the Venezuelan Statistics Agency (INE). The survey covers manufacturing plants that employ at least five individuals and is conducted using a stratified random sample procedure with 828 strata corresponding to four occupational categories, 23 estates and nine economic activities (ISIC revision 2 at 2 digits).
Results for the US are from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . Data for the US comes from the Census of Manufacturers conducted by the US Bureau of the Census. The census covers all manufacturing plants.
Data for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua are gathered by the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2006. The WBES collects data from firms in every region of the world that uses the same instruments and sampling methodology so that data are comparable across countries. For comparison, we use only data on manufacturing. The sample sizes for these three countries are much smaller than in the rest of the countries and therefore less reliable. 9 We use plant information on employees (production and non-production personnel), wages, value added (at constant prices), and capital stock (buildings, structures, machinery and equipment). When panel data were available, the plant capital stock was constructed recursively by depreciating the capital stock in the previous year and adding deflated investment. Otherwise, we used the book value of capital stock. 10 In the case of the national census and surveys we defined sectors at the 4-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level. In the WBES sectors are defined by the 3-digit ISIC codes.
Results

Firm Heterogeneity
Latin American economies exhibit larger productivity heterogeneity than the US and in many countries heterogeneity has increased over time. Table 1 We also used information from the WBES for Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. See Table A3 . 10 Most of the official data reside in the national institutes of statistics. Therefore we relied on a network of research teams that helped us running the codes. The computations in each country were made by the following reseachers: Argentina programs were run by A. Neumeyer and G. Sandleris; in Bolivia by C.G. Machicado and J.C. Birbuet; in Brazil, by C. Ferraz; in Chile and with the WBES, by M. Busso, L. Madrigal, and C. Pagés; in Colombia, by A. Camacho and E. Conover; Ecuador, by C. Arellano; El Salvador, by J.P. Atal, M. Busso and C. Cisneros; Mexico, by P. Martínez; Uruguay, by C. Casacuberta and N. Gandelman; and in Venezuela, by L. Kolovitch. In all cases the computations were done using a common program and, as much as possible, the same variable and sample definitions was used, too. All codes are available from the authors upon request. 90th and the 10th percentile, the inter-quartile range and the standard deviation. Each panel shows results for different samples.
Comparing across economies for which data for firms of 10 or more employees are available, we find that Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela display the highest productivity dispersion in the manufacturing sector, while Argentina and El Salvador tend to have the lowest. It is possible that since we are not considering the smallest firms this larger heterogeneity with respect to the US is actually underestimated. In fact, comparing economies where data are available for all firms, we find that both in El Salvador and in Mexico dispersion measures increase displaying a higher productive heterogeneity than the US.
11 When considering countries with data available for firms of 30 or more employees -as it is the case in Brazil -we find Brazil to be in the upper range of heterogeneity jointly with Mexico.
Results using the WBES also show a large dispersion of TFPQ in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. These results, however, are not directly comparable with those obtained using the official economic censuses and surveys whose sample size are at least ten times larger than those in the WBES.
Not only is productivity more heterogeneous in Latin American than in the US but also that heterogeneity has increased in most countries (all except Bolivia, Brazil and Mexico) during the period of study.
Overall, these results suggest that within narrowly defined sectors, some firms are much more productive than others. In the model sketched in Section 2, these firms should be able to command a larger size and therefore contribute more to the national output.
12 However the presence of distortions in the allocation of capital and labor would impede that from happening. We next assess how important this phenomenon is in our sample of countries. Table 2 shows the dispersion of the distribution of log ,
measured as the difference between the 90th and the 10th percentiles. 13 In an efficient allocation, marginal returns are equated across firms and therefore the dispersion of marginal returns and thus of TFPR would be zero.
Comparing the distribution of TFPR across countries with data for all firms, we find that the degree of misallocation is larger in El Salvador, and much larger in Mexico than in the US. In turn, comparing within countries for which data for firms with 10 or more employees is available we find El Salvador having the lowest dispersion in TFPR, and Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, having the highest. Again, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, from the WBES 11 Interestingly, there is more productive heterogeneity in these two economies than in China as reported in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) , regardless of the measure of dispersion employed. This may be, at least partly driven by the fact that Chinese data covers plants with revenues above US$600,000 and therefore excludes the smallest, possibly least productive firms. 12 It should also be noted that some of the dispersion is not due to real differences in productivities but to differences in quality within the sector which translate to prices. 13 In the Appendix Table A1 we provide other dispersion methods for the distributions of the three variables. ) and log(τ Y si ) with respect to the industry mean.
Results for the US are from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . Results showed in cols [1] and [2] Panels 1, 2, and 3 were shown graphically in Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2010) .
sample, show larger dispersion in TFPR than the average country for which we have official data. In sum, the data strongly suggest that all countries in Latin America have a higher degree of resources misallocation than the US. Moreover, both in the US and in almost all Latin America countries resource misallocation increased during the period of study. The large dispersion in distortions implies that resources are not efficiently allocated. To quantify how costly misallocation is for aggregate productivity in Latin America, we compute how much output each country loses due to resource misallocation. In particular, the cost of misallocation is measured as C = [(TFP * /TFP)-1] × 100. Table 3 shows the results. By reallocating existing capital and labor across firms, aggregate productivity in Latin America could increase between 41 and 122% depending on the countries, years or samples considered. For most countries the gains would be around 50-60%, with the exception of Mexico, where TFP could more than double if misallocation were to be corrected. These gains consider reallocation only within 4-digit industries. There could be further sizable gains from reallocating labor and capital across industries.
Only El Salvador and Mexico have data covering all firms, which are comparable to the US. The figures for these countries suggest that the potential gains of reallocation are larger than in the US. Taking the latest figures, improving the allocation of resources across firms could increase total factor productivity by 95% in Mexico and 60.1% in El Salvador, thus helping to close productivity gaps relative to the US by a substantial amount.
Robustness
The results in the previous section only include data on manufacturing and therefore ignore large sectors of the economy. Table 4 shows that resource allocation problems appear to be much larger outside manufacturing, particularly in the service sector.
14 In Uruguay, the potential gains of reducing misallocation are higher in retail than in manufacturing. In Mexico, the differential in gains across industries is even larger. While in manufacturing they are on the order of 95%, in retail they are 267% and, in the personal and community service sector, 246%. Similarly, De Vries (2009) analyzes the retail sector of Brazil and finds that the 
Results for the US are from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . Results showed in cols [1] and [2] Panels 1, 2, and 3 were shown graphically in from Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2010) .
potential gains of reallocating resources towards the most efficient retailers are very large, on the order of 257%.
In the previous section we assumed an elasticity of substitution within industries of three. In Table A2 we show dispersion measures and TFP gains calculated with a higher elasticity of five. As expected, in most countries, TFP gains increase. When the elasticity of substitution is higher any deviations in the price of inputs or outputs faced by individual firms produce larger alterations in the allocation of resources which explains potential higher TFP gains. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we control for distortions that could affect the capital share differently in different countries by assuming that α s is undistorted and measured as one minus the labor share in industry s in the US. In Table A2 , we present dispersion measures and TFP gains using the actual distribution of capital in each country. The results tend to stay in the same order of magnitude as when using exogenous factor shares from the US.
Misallocation and policies
The results presented above strongly suggest that in Latin America capital and labor are inefficiently allocated across firms. Therefore improving the allocation of resources could provide an important boost to productivity, helping close the output gap with more advanced economies. However, making those gains effective requires finding out the sources of misallocation.
In principle, there are a large number of policies that can distort the allocation of resources. Guner, Ventura and Xu (2008) analyze policy distortions that depend on establishment size. That is, policies that restrict production of large firms or promote production in small ones. Examples of such policies range from uneven enforcement of tax and regulations, to subsidies for small firms, to imperfections in the credit market. They find that size-dependent policies have large effects on welfare, output and productivity. The theoretical and the empirical literature on the drivers of misallocation have focused mainly on three types of sizedependent policies: financial markets imperfections, uneven taxation and poorly enforced labor market regulations.
One important cause of resource misallocation is a poorly functioning financial market. There is evidence that banks can favor loans to unproductive firms (Peek and Rosengren 2005) and a large literature measuring the effect of financial frictions on misallocation of resources and aggregate productivity. 15 Although the depth of the Latin American countries' financial markets has improved in the last decade, it remains low by international standards (de la Torre, Ize and Schmukler 2012). A series of macroeconomic and credit crises in the 1980s and 1990s left a toll, and while financial markets have deepened in the last 10 years, they still leave many firms underserved. When productive firms cannot get access to resources to fund good ideas, they cannot attain their optimal size given their productivity. This should then be reflected in high marginal revenue productivity relative to the average. Allocating resources from low to high marginal revenue productivity firms would increase aggregate productivity. Since small firms tend to be more credit constrained, then, if credit is an important determinant of misallocation one would expect to see higher marginal revenue products for smaller than for larger firms within narrowly defined sectors. Another potential source of misallocation, related to the functioning of capital markets, occurs when directed or subsidized credit is diverted to inefficient firms. Resource misallocation can also occur if directed credit provides cheap credit to inefficient firms, thereby allowing inefficient firms to expand.
Another possible culprit for resource misallocation is corporate taxation. Weak enforcement capabilities combined with a tax system that taxes more the largest firms and that in many cases stipulates more generous tax regimes for small firms can create strong incentives for firms to produce in non-registered informal establishments. This would result in larger than optimal sizes for many small firms and smaller than efficient sizes for larger firms that compete in the same sector.
A third possible explanation of misallocation is labor market regulations. Heckman and Pagés (2003) show that in Latin America, firing and hiring regulations are quite restrictive and mandate large payments from firms to workers in case of dismissal. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) show that taxes on job destruction affect employment and productivity. In addition, a number of social insurance programs are paid for with payroll contributions (Levy 2008) . Weak enforcement mechanisms evidenced, for example, in an insufficient number of inspectors, combined with a preponderance of very small firms -which increases the costs of enforcement -implies most inspections occur in larger firms. It is therefore more difficult to evade social contributions and regulations in larger firms. Therefore, if unevenly enforced regulations and social insurance contributions are the culprits of misallocation, we should expect to see marginal revenue products that are increasing in plan size. In fact, Busso, Fazio and Levy (2012) find that, in the case of Mexico, distortions are highly correlated with informality and payroll tax evasion.
Firm size, distortions and productivity
A natural starting point to assess which type of firms are being hurt or benefited by policies in the region is to investigate the relation between firm size, productivity and distortions. In an efficient economy, firms that are more productive than their competitors should win market share over time, hiring more labor and capital and expanding their production. Firm size should therefore be positively correlated with firm productivity. 16 Nonetheless, firms do not grow indefinitely because in order to sell more, they would need to cut prices to a point where they would make lower profits. The relationship between firm size and productivity becomes weaker if market or government failures favor some firms over others, allowing some firms to gain market share (size) even if they are less productive, or preventing some firms from gaining market share even if they are highly productive. Table 5 shows that there indeed is a positive association between productivity and firm size in all countries in our sample. The table shows regressions coefficients estimates from a simple OLS model of log 16 The argument is that productivity determines size, with more productive firms growing to be larger, rather than the other way around: i.e., larger firms become more productive as a result of their size. Yet a positive relationship between total factor productivity and size can also be driven by economies of scale. This is because most methods of computing TFP assume constant returns to scale; therefore, increasing returns to scale would wrongly show up as higher TPF for bigger firms.
Most firm size coefficients are positive and statistically significant, and are monotonically increasing with size. Only in Ecuador, there is no clear relationship between productivity (TFPQ) and size. Productivity increases steeply with size in Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia, and less so in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2010) show that Latin America is a region characterized by a large proportion of small firms. They report that in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador and Mexico between 80 and 90% of their establishments have less than ten employees. Those establishments hire between 20 and 45% of the employees in manufacture. In the US only 55% of the establishments have more than 10 employees and they only employ 4% of the workers in manufacture. This distribution of resources towards small firms combined with the fact that small firms have low productivity helps explaining the productivity gap between the region and the US.
Distortions, measured by log ,
are also typically increasing in firm size. Table 6 shows that in Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico, the marginal revenue product is larger in medium and large firms than in the smallest ones. In other words, in these countries providing extra resources to medium or large firms would yield higher returns than providing resources to smaller ones. The implication is that in these countries, most small firms are not too small, but rather too large relative to what they should be in an efficient allocation. In these countries it is difficult to argue that the main source of distortions is capital market constraints which typically hurt small firms relatively more. Instead, it looks as if small firms are subsidized, for instance by not paying taxes and circumventing regulations. In this set of countries, tax evasion and informality concentrated in the smallest firms are very plausible sources of misallocation.
In Uruguay and Chile, on the other hand, the returns to an extra unit of capital and labor tend to decline with firm size, indicating that the smallest firms are constrained, while the largest firms seem to be subsidized, given their productivity. Here credit market constraints could be a more likely source of distortions against smaller firms. Moreover, Uruguay and Chile are characterized by a lower level of evasion and higher level of formality than other countries in the region (Gomez Sabaine and Jimenez 2012) which may also explain why small firms are relatively more size constrained, as they cannot easily compensate for low access to credit with tax and social security evasion. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were shown graphically in Busso, Madrigal, and Pagés (2010) . Table 6 Correlates of TFPR.
Size category Argentina Bolivia
Brazil
Chile Colombia Ecuador El Salvador Uruguay Venezuela Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Size 10 We calculate the percentage of firms that are currently small, medium and large that would decrease in size if all distortions were eliminated and TFPR was equalized between firms in any given sector. The results are shown in Table 7 . "Small" here means the bottom 25% of firms in the distribution of value added, "large" means the top 25% and "medium" the 50% in the middle of the distribution. In general, firms that are currently small are more likely to shrink than large firms in an efficient allocation of resources. The only exception is Colombia. We interpret this result as an indication that most distortions affect small firms and that these distortions go in the direction of favoring larger than efficient sizes for firms that are currently small firms. In other words, the results suggest that the majority of small firms are not too small but rather too large given their productivity.
Distortions and policies
What are the policies that correlate best with distortions in the data? The WBES has information that allows measuring productivity, distortions as well as information on which policies and institutions may constrain the operation of firms. More specifically, the standardized questionnaire of the WBES includes a number of objective and subjective questions to assess the degree by which firms are Notes: In each country-year, plants are put into quartiles based on their actual value-added, with an equal number of plants in each quartile. Small refers to firms in the bottom quartile, medium in the 2nd and 3rd quartile and large firms in the 4th quartile. The hypothetically efficient level of each plant's output is then calculated, assuming distortions are removed so that TFPR levels are equalized within industries. The entries above show the percent of plants with efficient/actual output levels in the four bins 0-50% or 50-100% (efficient output less than half actual output).
affected by policy constraints. Given the large number of variables of interest in the survey, we use factor analysis to achieve some dimensionality reduction. We build a series of scales that allows us to measure the level of intensity and the dispersion of the different policy constraints faced by firms. We then correlate those measures with the dispersion in marginal revenue products. We use three pieces of information to build the policy scales. First, we rely on a set of subjective questions about managers' opinions regarding the difficulty of overcoming regulatory obligations and other important obstacles. In each firm i in sector s in country c, the manager is asked if a given problem is an obstacle (O isc ) to the operation of the establishment.
17 Second, firms in all countries are asked to rank the top-three obstacles that affect operation and growth of their establishment, we denote these by T isc . Third, we rely on a number of variables related to policy constraints (X isc ). Most are objective and some are opinions or perceptions about a given subject.
We group the variables {O isc , T isc , X isc } in five categories to estimate five scales, or policy constraints, D isc using principal factor model analysis to measure: restricted access to capital, restrictive labor regulations, bad functioning of the courts, detrimental regulations and institutional instability, unfair or excessive taxation. 18 In each model we retain all factors with eigenvalues larger than one. In all cases, one (and only one) factor was found suggesting that the selected The other scales, measuring bad functioning of courts, bad regulations and institutional instability, and unfair taxation, do not seem to matter much. In Panel B we find similar results for access to capital and labor regulations (although the latter is barely insignificant at traditional levels). However, now the other policy measures seem to also correlate with the dispersion in marginal revenue product.
Overall, we take these results jointly with the ones found in previous sections as confirming the conclusion reached before that in some countries labor regulations are the most likely explanation of misallocation while in others it is credit constraints.
obstacle. (V) Unfair Taxation: (1) Degree of obstacle of taxes for the current operations of the establishment; (2) Degree of obstacle for the current operation: tax administration; (3) Taxation listed as a top 3 obstacle; (4) % of sales declared for corporate or sales taxes; (5) Establishment was visited and or inspected by tax officials; (6) Located in capital city (i.e., easier to monitor). 19 The code is available at Matias Busso's webpage. 
Conclusion
We assess the extent of heterogeneity of firm productivity and distortions within narrowly defined sectors in Latin America. We find that dispersion in these two measures is much larger than in the US, suggesting the possibility of gains from moving to an efficient allocation of resources in manufacturing. We show that indeed those gains are typically on the order of 60%. These large disparities in productivity and substantial resource misallocation open important avenues for productivity growth.
The evidence presented provides some interesting clues as to the likely sources of misallocation in Latin America. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is not much evidence for the hypothesis that very small firms are too small, or that they are size constrained. Only in Chile and Uruguay are marginal products of capital clearly declining in size. As indicated, even if small firms suffer from constraints to access to capital, other factors, such as their partial or total noncompliance with taxes, social security mandates and labor regulations, provide them with an implicit subsidy that allows them to be larger than the size that would be warranted by their productivity.
While the gains from improving resource allocation and the mix of firms would provide only temporary sources of growth, they could provide a huge leap forward similar to what the region enjoyed during the period of rapid urbanization and structural transformation during the 1950s and 1960s. This transformation would require reforms aimed at reducing the distortions created by differences in tax codes and uneven enforcement of taxes and regulations, improving social insurance policies and improving the functioning of capital markets. 
